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Towards Automatic Deployment of Virtual Firewalls to Support Secure mMTC in 5G Networks

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1 **Abstract**—Internet of Things (IoT) has emerged as the main
2 **enabler to deal with challenging use cases that require massive**
3 **Machine-Type Communications (mMTC), and mMTC has been**
4 **recognized as one of three use case types for the Fifth Generation**
5 **(5G) and beyond networks. In IoT networks, it is prohibitive**
6 **to rely on just one firewall where hundreds of thousands of**
7 **rules need to be installed in order to provide security counter-**
8 **measures to each of the IoT devices. To fill this gap, this**
9 **paper proposes an automatic deployment of virtual firewalls**
10 **by leveraging Network Function Virtualisation (NFV) Manage-**
11 **ment and Orchestration (MANO) to protect NB-IoT mMTC**
12 **communications. The main idea underneath is to use NFV to**
13 **deal with efficient rule distribution across VNFs-based firewalls**
14 **to achieve scalability in the number of managed IoT devices.**
15 **Empirical results have validated the design and implementation**
16 **of the proposed scheme and demonstrating its advantageous**
17 **performance and scalability. In particular, the deployment time**
18 **for this VNF-based firewall service is highlighted to meet the**
19 **requirement of a 5G Key Performance Indicator (KPI).**

20 *Keywords*—5G; NB-IoT; Security; Firewall; Automatic Deploy-
21 *ment; VNF; MANO; NFV.*

I. INTRODUCTION

22
23 The European 5G Public Private Partnership (5G PPP)
24 [1] has defined ambitious Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)
25 to be fulfilled in 5G networks. One of these KPIs is to
26 achieve 1 million devices per square kilometer [2]. This
27 KPI is associated to massive Machine-Type Communications
28 (mMTC), one of the three use cases defined by ITU¹
29 regarding the novel capabilities that 5G networks should
30 support. This high-density scenario is traditionally associated
31 to cheap insecure IoT sensors and actuators, which cannot
32 enforce proper security mechanisms. To enable secure mMTC
33 in 5G networks, the network infrastructure needs to be ready
34 to deal with diverse kinds of cyber-attacks.

35 To dynamically mitigate those cyber-attacks in a 5G-
36 enabled IoT network, both the Edge and the Core of the
37 5G network need to filter, mirror, divert and differentiate
38 IoT packets. Nonetheless, dealing with those attacks requires
39 deploying a large number of firewall rules on each of these
40 radio access points in order to deal with the control and
41 security of the devices. Using hardware-based approaches for
42 this large number of rules will impose a significant increase
43 in the costs of the network elements mainly due to the
44 memory requirements associated. In contrast, using software-
45 based and Virtual Network Functions (VNFs) approaches will
46 reduce costs but would impose challenges to deal with the
47 scalability of the rules.

48 Our previous paper [3] has performed an empirical eval-
49 uation to determine how many firewall rules can be deployed
50 inside a VNF virtual firewall to deal with NB-IoT traffic
51 crossing the 5G network without decreasing the Quality of
52 Service (QoS) of the transmission. The increasing number of
53 filtering rules attached in each VNF firewall downgrades its
54 performance since more computational processing is needed
55 to check all the rules for the traffic in this software-based
56 solution. Therefore, a balance in terms of capacity and
57 performance has been determined.

58 This paper further explores a distributed VNF firewall
59 architecture, where the system can either insert a new firewall
60 rule inside an existing VNF firewall or deploy a new VNF
61 firewall to provide more computational resources to handle
62 scalability. To allow a cognitive network management system
63 to make efficient decisions on actions, a deep understanding
64 of the problem is needed. Whilst the previous paper focused
65 on firewall rule configuration times and optimal number
66 for maximum rules per VNF, this paper investigates VNF
67 deployment times to perform the automatic deployment of a
68 new VNF Firewall and configuration times of the VNF. The
69 main aim is to provide an architecture that is able to deal
70 with the high-density number of devices imposed in mMTC
71 scenarios by making an efficient distribution of firewall rules
72 among different VNFs. The design has been empirically
73 validated in a realistic 5G multi-tenant infrastructure.

74 This paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews
75 existing service deployment orchestration techniques and
76 IoT security systems. Section III outlines the management
77 framework. Section IV describes the virtualized 5G infras-
78 tructure deployed for a realistic NB-IoT testbed. Deployment
79 of new VNFs with the proposed virtual IoT firewall as a
80 service is presented in Section V. Section VI reports the
81 experimental results in terms of efficiency, suitability and
82 scalability. Finally, conclusions and future work are included
83 in Section VII.

II. RELATED WORK

84
85 5G-PPP has highlighted autonomous and cognitive net-
86 work management as a key enabler in 5G networks for
87 handling complex networking scenarios, especially when
88 manual management is prohibitive such as in mMTC [4].

A. 5G Service Deployment Orchestration

89
90 Autonomous and cognitive network management requires
91 automated orchestration in interacting with different Appli-
92 cation Programming Interfaces (APIs) that control, manage
93 and configure resources and services. Following the Mobile

¹<https://www.itu.int/md/R15-SG05-C-0040/en>

94 Edge Computing (MEC) [5] architecture, an orchestrator
95 to control a large number of distributed machines requires
96 capabilities in operating system provisioning, NFV provi-
97 sioning, resource life-cycle control, NFV life-cycle control,
98 multi-tenancy support, multi-zone support, service location
99 awareness, workflow dependencies resolution and parallel
100 deployment optimization, among other features.

101 OpenMano [6] delivers an open source management and
102 orchestration (MANO) stack aligned with ETSI NFV Infor-
103 mation Models. It covers resource and service life-cycle man-
104 agement. OpenBaton [7] is an extensible and customizable
105 framework capable of orchestrating network services across
106 heterogeneous NFV Infrastructures. It uses OpenStack to
107 control the underline infrastructure. OpenMANO and Open-
108 Baton cover mainly NFV life-cycle management, resource
109 management, multi-tenancy support, and multi-zone support.
110 Chirivella et al. [8] provides an inclusive solution for the
111 complete life cycle of 5G service deployment over multi-
112 tenant 5G MEC infrastructures, based on Juju, MaaS and
113 OpenStack. Our research work presented in this paper is
114 based on this orchestration software, which has been extended
115 to perform the automatic deployment of the architecture
116 proposed. The virtual firewall is wrapped to be manageable
117 by the orchestrator to allow the automatic deployment of VNF
118 firewalls.

119 B. Existing NB-IoT Attack Mitigation Systems

120 Parakovic et al. [9] describe how the volume of attacks
121 has increased by 651% in the last two years, mainly due to
122 the increasing number of IoT devices connected. The Mirai
123 attack in 2016 has motivated the community to better research
124 how to defence against DDoS attacks (e.g., [10]) and new
125 autonomic schemes for thread mitigation are consequently
126 being defined (e.g., [11]). Despite the considerable number
127 of related studies in the area of IoT security, there is still
128 no solution to protect NB-IoT devices connected to the
129 5G infrastructure, where the new infrastructure entails novel
130 mechanisms able to deal with nested traffic encapsulation pro-
131 duced, e.g., by multi-tenancy and mobility support. In [12],
132 Hsieh et al. propose Virtual MEC (vMEC) to increase IoT
133 applications' Quality of Service (QoS). Miettinen et al. [13]
134 present Sentinel, a system capable of automatically identify-
135 ing types of devices being connected to an IoT network and
136 enabling enforcement of rules for constraining the vulnerable
137 communications. Meng [14] proposes an Intrusion Detection
138 System (IDS) that can be automatically deployed in the server
139 to perform trust computation based on traffic features. In
140 [15] a multi-level DDoS mitigation framework (MLDMF) for
141 Industrial IoT (IIoT) is proposed, which includes the cloud
142 computing, fog computing, edge computing and Software
143 Defined Networking (SDN) for improving access security and
144 efficient management of IIoT. Saraïm et al. [16] introduce
145 NETRA, a Docker-based architecture for virtualizing network
146 functions to provide IoT security by deploying security
147 functions at the network edge.

148 Moreover, a comparative study of different IoT mali-
149 cious traffic mitigation systems has been conducted in [3].
150 The conclusion is that existing work is based merely on
151 either detection or mitigation of such traffic. Little work
152 has considered a complete detection and mitigation control
153 loop for 5G IoT networks. Furthermore, as far as we know,

there is barely any existing deployment and configuration
strategies integrated as part of the actuation in a cognitive
5G IoT management framework. These gaps have motivated
this research work.

158 III. OVERVIEW OF 5G IOT MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

159 NB-IoT deployment in 5G networks imposes challenging
160 management requirements, such as multi-tenancy (differenti-
161 ation of traffic from different network operators, carriers or
162 verticals sharing the same physical infrastructure), scalability
163 (support of a massive number of IoT devices), and dynamic
164 network management of the traffic according to security poli-
165 cies and the current context obtained from real-time monitor-
166 ing. These requirements demand novel security management
167 frameworks that can rely on software defined network (SDN)
168 management and Network Function Virtualization (NFV)
169 technologies for handling the dynamic and scalability, thereby
170 deploying or decommissioning, on-demand, virtual network
171 security functions such as virtual firewalls (vFirewalls).

172 Figure 1 shows the general architecture of the security
173 management framework employed in this paper and was
174 presented in our previous work [3]. The architecture is
175 split into three main planes. The Admin Plane includes the
176 GUI and tools for security management, including security
177 policy tools. The Security Orchestration Plane endows the
178 framework with the proper cyber-situational awareness, intel-
179 ligence and orchestration tools to make security and network
180 decisions dynamically according to the circumstances. To
181 this aim, it interacts with the Monitoring module to gather
182 network and system information from physical and virtual
183 agents deployed either in the edge or in the core of the
184 network. Moreover, in this plane, the Reaction/Cognitive
185 module embraces a decision support system that provides the
186 required intelligence to generate the proper reaction plan and
187 countermeasures that need to be deployed in the system to
188 address misbehaviour in the system, e.g., in an event of an
189 attack. The Security Orchestrator manages the security plan
190 and orchestrates the enforcement of the security countermea-
191 sures in the systems. For this purpose, it instructs the Security
192 Enforcement Plane, which is in turn, is composed of the
193 IoT Controller, SDN Controller and NFV MANO to deploy
194 and (re)configure the VNFs. NFV-MANO is responsible for
195 secure placement and management of VNFs and Security
196 VNFs over the virtualized infrastructure managed by the
197 Virtual Infrastructure Manager (VIM) component. Thus, it is
198 in charge of realizing the scalable and dynamic deployment
199 of vFirewalls required in our solution. The vFirewall can be
200 deployed at the edge close to the Radio Access Network
201 (RAN) or in the core of the 5G network. In addition, the SDN
202 Controller upon an orchestration command coming from the
203 North-bound API can add or update filtering rules in the
204 vFirewall.

205 IV. VIRTUALIZED 5G INFRASTRUCTURE

206 Figure 2 shows an overview of the experimental in-
207 frastructure deployed for conducting the validation of the
208 proposed framework. A virtualized LTE-based architecture,
209 which also includes several 5G features, is presented and
210 explained in this section. 10 Computers with Ubuntu 16.04
211 operating system and OpenStack Mitaka compose this infras-
212 tructure. The deployment utilizes Neutron and OpenDayLight




Figure 1. Management architecture for the proposed system

213 as the SDN Controller. OpenDayLight uses OpenFlow and
 214 OVSDB for controlling the Open Virtual Switch (OVS)
 215 software, which, in turn, controls the data path of virtual
 216 machines. As can be seen from the figure, different colours
 217 (blue and purple) represent different tenant/administrative
 218 domains, and each one has used a completely different set
 219 of VNFs along the 5G network. By using the last release
 220 of the Mosaic5G² project, a decoupling between DU and
 221 CU on the RAN side has been achieved. Although the
 222 components in the Evolved Packet Core (EPC) still use
 223 the MME, HSS and SGW/PGW terminology, they are fully
 224 virtualized and running in VNFs in line with the 5G vision.
 225 Those VNFs provided by Mosaic5G, which is an evolution of
 226 OpenAirInterface³, have been deployed by using a VIM such
 227 as OpenStack⁴. OpenStack controls those virtual resources
 228 and allows the sharing of physical resources by more than one
 229 tenant. In addition, a Service Infrastructure Manager (SIM)
 230 deploys services over virtual layers, controls the life-cycle of
 231 the services and allows functionalities such as redeployment,
 232 reconfiguration, upgrading, start and stop. The SIM employed
 233 in this research is the one referred to as VNFM in the
 234 ETSI MANO architecture, i.e., Juju [17]. Following the
 235 same approach, the VIM deploys new virtual machines when
 236 required and add them to the vFirewall stack of a specific
 237 tenant. Later on, by using the SIM, those virtual machines

²<http://mosaic-5g.io/>

³<http://www.openairinterface.org/>

⁴<https://www.openstack.org/>

238 are configured as NB-IoT services. This workflow is further
 239 explained in more detail in section V.

240 It has been previously demonstrated [3] that the proposed
 241 NB-IoT vFirewall is not only able to deal with IoT protocols
 242 but also 5G network traffic with nested encapsulation such
 243 as Virtual eXtensible Local Area (VXLAN) and/or General
 244 Packet Radio Service (GPRS) Tunneling Protocol (GTP) to
 245 provide features such as mobility, tenant isolation, admission
 246 control and so on. Since 5G packets travelling along this
 247 infrastructure are encapsulated by different encapsulation
 248 protocols depending on the network segment, this is a perfect
 249 scenario to allow investigating and analyze NB-IoT traffic
 250 throughout all different network segments.

V. SCALABLE DEPLOYMENT OF vFIREFALLS DESIGN

251 The designed approach is focused on automatical deploy-
 252 ment of NB-IoT vFirewalls when required from the security
 253 policies in the framework. Each VNF instantiated for this
 254 purpose will have a different set of rules for multi-tenancy,
 255 device mobility and NB-IoT compliance for handling traffic
 256 crossing the infrastructure. Those rules represent specific
 257 traffic that needs to be mitigated for security reasons. In
 258 order to speed up the service configuration process, the split
 259 of rules between different VNFs is carried out using, like
 260 a splitting criterion, the source IP address where a mask
 261 is applied to determine to which VNF should be installed.
 262 There is an inventory with the number of VNFs currently
 263 deployed and a modulus is applied over the result of the
 264




Figure 2. Network infrastructure with vFirewalls for the proposed system

265 marking in order to determine the associated VNF. Therefore,
 266 when the Orchestrator triggers the action of deploying a new
 267 vFirewall for a specific tenant, the vFirewall already knows
 268 how to perform the loading of rules as this is instructed by
 269 the configuration service parameters.

270 The following describes the required steps for deploying
 271 a new VNF with a 5G vFirewall acting as a service. Figure
 272 3 defines a workflow diagram, which represents different
 273 phases since the Orchestrator sends the command to add a
 274 new virtual NB-IoT Firewall.

275 In the first step, the Orchestrator sends a deployment
 276 request to the SIM for deploying a new VNF. That request
 277 message is triggered when the framework described in section
 278 III detects that there are not enough advisable resources
 279 on existing vFirewalls for applying a new set of rules or
 280 because those vFirewalls are handling a different NB-IoT
 281 device domain. Subsequently, the SIM (Juju) interacts with
 282 the VIM (OpenStack) to start the installation of the operating
 283 system. The VIM returns a success response to the SIM once
 284 that process is finished. Secondly, once the operating system
 285 has been installed, the SIM sends a request to the previously
 286 created VNF for installing the Element Managed System
 287 (EMS), which is able to control the life-cycle of each service
 288 deployed including actions such as start, stop, re-install,
 289 uninstall, redeploy, reconfigure and so on. When the EMS
 290 installation is completed, the same VNF notifies the SIM
 291 (Juju), which in turn does the same with the Orchestrator.
 292 Finally, the Orchestrator starts the installation procedure of
 293 the 5G vFirewall service by sending this request to the SIM.
 294 Consequently, the SIM performs the installation and initial
 295 configuration of the VNF service, and notifies the Orches-
 296 trator. After that, the Orchestrator will select the rule set
 297 given by the upper layers and will interact directly with the




Figure 3. Sequence diagram to deploy a new vFirewall

new VNF vFirewall in order to load the configuration therein. 298
 Finally, the Orchestrator configures OpenStack (Neutron) in 299
 order to redirect the traffic to the new VNF Firewall created. 300

VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

A. Testbed description

The following testbed has been created to empirically validate the proposed design and evaluate the service deployment times by measuring the performance of the installation of vFirewalls as VNF services in the proposed 5G infrastructure. The testbed has been built by employing 6 physical machines as managed computers, each one with 8 cores, 24 Gbytes of RAM, and 4x1Gbps Ethernet NICs + IPMI Ethernet. Each physical machine contains up to 8 VMs. Therefore, the managed infrastructure consists of up to 48 machines. These machines are managed by a physical machine with an Intel Xeon Processor E5-2630 v4 with 32GBytes and 3x10Gbit Ethernet NIC, acting as a management plane. Although it is known that nested virtualization has a negative impact on performance, this testbed has allowed us to demonstrate the scalability of the proposed system with a large number of managed resources. Therefore, better performance results can be expected at production grade deployments. It is worth mentioning that the infrastructure presented in Figure 2 matches the deployment carried out in our testbed.

B. NB-IoT Virtual Firewall Capacity Test

Figure 4 provides the configuration times of a VNF firewall from scratch when all filtering rules have to be loaded to the system at once to provide the initial configuration of the vFirewall. In order to figure out a trade-off in terms of scalability, a set of experiments were carried out by applying a different number of filtering rules in the initial configuration. As seen in the figure, a base two exponential stressing test has been conducted. The results show that 4096 filtering NB-IoT rules are the maximum that each vFirewall can load at its configuration time without surpassing 1 second. Beyond that point, the configuration time increases over limits that would not be efficient enough in terms of response time, delay and packet losses.




Figure 4. Configuration time of adding NB-IoT service-aware 5G multi-tenant Infrastructure rules

In addition to configuration times, Table I shows Packet Loss Ratio, Transmission Time Overhead and Jitter when 4096 simultaneous NB-IoT devices are being inspected in real-time from one vFirewall. It should be noted that these

experiments have been conducted by assuming a homogeneous set of IoT devices with specific features. However, the proposed solution would also be able to deal with heterogeneous IoT environments as long as those devices comply with the specs herein defined. For a deeper analysis of heterogeneity in terms of IoT devices, we refer to our previous work in [3]. For a deeper analysis of heterogeneity in terms of IoT devices, we refer to our previous work in [3]. As can be seen in the third column, the performance of all of the metrics are within reasonable ranges. There is no packet loss or transmission time overhead and the Jitter is acceptable for NB-IoT applications. Therefore, this test has proved the feasibility of the proposed solution.

TABLE I. STATISTICS WHEN 4096 FLOWS ARE BEING SIMULTANEOUSLY HANDLED

Measured Feature	Units	Value
Packet Loss Ratio	Percentage	0.00%
Transmission Time Overhead	Seconds	0
Average of Jitter	Milliseconds	0.2414
Configuration Time	Seconds	0.8

C. Scalability and Stress Results

This section validates the scalability results achieved when different stress methods are applied to the proposed system. Figure 5 provides the deployment times by increasing the scale of the vFirewalls deployment scenario exponentially from 2 VMs up to 48 VMs with each VM performing a loading a 4096 rule set. It leads to a scenario supporting from 4096 NB-IoT to a maximum of 196,608 NB-IoT devices. Moreover, it is noted that for each of these scenarios, different ramping times have been executed. The ramping time is defined as the time elapsed between two requests for the instantiation of a new vFirewall each time. Therefore, the lower the ramping time is, the higher the system is stressed since it means that all the NB-IoT devices have been very rapidly connected to the system and the time for requests between different VNFs is very low. The results show four different levels of stress: 0s, 1s, 5s and 10s, 0s being the most stressed one, meaning that all the NB-IoT devices (196,608 devices for the largest scenario analyzed) are simultaneously connected.

At a glance, Figure 5 shows linear trends in deployment times regardless of the number of vFirewalls deployed and also regardless of the level of stress of the system (ramping time). These results clearly validate the scalability of the proposed system. It is noted that in order to emulate this large number of NB-IoT devices, we have gathered Packet Captures (PCAPs) from the real infrastructure and replicated them with different IP addresses to generate the traffic associated to each of the NB-IoT devices and thus stress the data path.

Figure 5 shows three different times stacked. The first time is the time spent on the installation of the VM itself, which is around 4s taking in all the cases. The second one represents the time consumed in installing the EMS and the vFirewall component in this VM, which is always around 3s. Finally, the third time is the loading time of all the firewall rules related to all the NB-IoT devices inside the vFirewall. It can be concluded that the system scales with respect to the number of VNFs and also with respect to the ramping time,

AUTOMATIC DEPLOYMENT




Figure 5. Deployment times of vFirewalls with different number of machines and ramping times

which implies that it scales with a large number of NB-IoT devices.

It is worth noting that there is a fourth measured time that is the time required to configure OpenStack in order to redirect the traffic to the newly create vFirewall in order to include it into the data path. However, this negligible time is not shown in the figure since it is less than 1ms and it cannot be seen in the graph with the scale in seconds.

VII. CONCLUSION

This paper has proposed a new virtual firewall based IoT security solution and its automatic deployment scheme for 5G mMTC scenarios. The solution performs a smart trade-off between configuring rules in an existing VNF firewall and performing the deployment of a new VNF firewall, configuring the virtual firewall into the data plane and allowing splitting the large rule set between the existing ones. Experimental results have validated the maximum number of NB-IoT multi-tenant rules that can be managed by each of the virtual firewalls. Moreover, empirical deployment results have displayed a clear linear trend in the deployment times of new VNFs when the scenario scales up, thereby validating the proper scalability of the architecture. In addition, performance results have shown the feasibility to deal with close to 200,000 NB-IoT devices, through the automatic deployment of 48 virtual firewalls in less than 6.4 minutes (i.e., only 8 sec per firewall on average).

In future work, we will investigate other kinds of virtual network security functions such as virtual Channel-Protection, to be deployed at the edge of the NB-IoT network, in order to protect and isolate further traffic among users, carriers and verticals in different network slices.

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