Words and power in conflict - Rwanda under M.R.N.D. rule
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This article examines the role of power in relation to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. The context is initially set through a short ethnographic account of the author’s first-hand experiences in Rwanda, then further developed in a literature review focused on the role of propaganda as a tool to divide the Hutu and Tutsi populations in the decades leading to 1994. The research is situated at the nexus of relationships between Hutu and Tutsi citizens, between Hutu M.R.N.D. (National Revolutionary Movement for Development – the sole political party in Rwanda at the time) officials and other powerful Hutu figures, and between Hutu M.R.N.D. officials and citizens. An original critical discourse analysis of transcribed speeches made by President Juvénal Habyarimana and Leon Mugesera, former M.R.N.D. vice chairman, form the basis of the research underpinning the article’s discussion and conclusions. In a theoretical sense, the article ascribes at least some of the causes of conflict in the Rwandan context to centralised power-knowledge-discourse, combining complementary aspects of theory developed by Weber, Dahl and Foucault. This article therefore, through a wholly novel combination of the theoretical intersections in question, and the original adaptation of data analysis and subsequent presentation, is intended to make a valuable contribution to the extant body of knowledge and published work that cuts across the themes of propaganda, identity-based conflict, hate speech, and the power of authority figures to control large numbers of the masses through propaganda and public discourse.

The consequential extent of abuse of power – an ethnographic account

Looking over the lifeless body of a woman cradling her deceased baby. There they lie still, on a wooden bedframe. Scanning around the room there are perhaps another fifty bodies. All unnaturally whitened as a result of the powder used to preserve them and prevent decomposition. And this is just one room. Next door there is another room, and another next
door to that. There is an identical building behind this one, and another behind that, both containing room upon room of preserved bodies, about a thousand in all. Macabre, but kept on display to remind any visitors to Murambi in Rwanda of what the ultimate result of unrestrained hatred can be. This was the direct result of the Genocide against the Tutsi carried out in Rwanda in 1994. It is extremely difficult not to become emotional and feel nauseous when faced with such alarmingly brutal reality. This is not the experience of viewing a Mummy from ancient Egypt in a museum. That baby should still be alive today. He or she would be a mere twenty-six years of age, perhaps freshly graduating from university or at the early stages of a career path. Instead he or she is forever a dead baby, killed not just by that direct event of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, but also as a culmination of two decades of presidency and government that wielded totalitarian power, that endorsed impunity for those that engaged in hate fuelled discussion and actions against their Tutsi neighbours up to and including acts of mass murder. A powerful government that looked on, knew what was happening, and did not condemn or criticise. In fact, they encouraged it.

**A Modern Humanitarian Disaster**

An equally difficult moment came when visiting Nyamata church. The church was a place where thousands of Tutsi took refuge, believing that the killers would not dare commit killings in such a sacred place. They were wrong. When the killers advanced, those hiding were trapped, and with a combination of machetes, guns and grenades, aside from a few who escaped or were hidden beneath piles of bodies, nearly all were murdered. Nyamata now stands as a memorial site, with purpose built mass graves for the thousands of victims that died in the surrounding region. My most extreme emotional experience emerged when looking over the clothes of the victims piled and hung over the church pews. I came across the section where children’s clothing was located, and at the top of the pile was a small green jumper, decorated with cartoon characters, about the size that would fit a child of two or three years of age. This would have
come from the young child who almost certainly was killed whilst wearing it. A modern child, who liked the same cartoons and shared the same cultures that children today still enjoy. I am unashamed to say that I wept. I had a son of about the same age at home for whom that jumper would have fitted perfectly. This was not a historical issue that we can detach ourselves from. This was a contemporary calamity, that although many would deny it, can happen again if extremist policies and unlimited power go unchallenged.

**Rwanda – The Literature**

Uvin (1999) explains that the institutionalisation within public policy of positive discrimination in favour of Hutu combined with anti-Tutsi sentiment were crucial elements in the ongoing retention of absolute power by Habyarimana and his M.R.N.D. Government, and that through their controlled public discourse they had the power, used in practice, to escalate or de-escalate tensions and violence at will. He explains that:

> Rwanda provides an almost perfect example of the dynamics that have been discussed by scholars of genocides: the existence of long-standing, widespread, and institutionalized prejudice; the radicalization of animosity and routinization of violence; the “moral exclusion” of a category of people, allowing first their “social death” and then their physical death. (1999: P253)

Uvin discusses Rwanda’s colonial history, and in particular the ethnic identity labels Hutu, Tutsi and Twa being a source of debate as to their precolonial origins. Although preference appears in the literature to point toward the caste system explanation, there is by no means a consensus on this point. In any case, Hintjens explains that:

> As early as 1959, the evidence suggested that on average Tutsi Rwandans were no better off than Rwandan Hutu... Unfortunately, this did nothing to counter racial stereotypes propagated by the Belgian colonizers. Notions of racial inferiority and superiority were adopted by Rwandans themselves (i.e. internalized) and made it very difficult to construct a shared anti-colonial form of nationalist identity. (2001: P30)

What this indicates is that the colonial strategy of divide and rule had been successful with the divisions now internalised to the population and not viewed as the responsibility of the
As Gurr argues, it “…is not the presence of a particular trait or combination of traits, but rather the shared perception that the defining traits, whatever they are, set the group apart.” (1993: 4)

As Uvin (1999) discusses that the historical power and dominance of the Tutsi at the State level, as orchestrated by the Belgian colonists became a proxy for how the Hutu population also viewed the rest of the Tutsi population in the country at the time. It must be understood that conflicts dating back to 1959 and the Hutu uprising which immediately preceded Rwandan independence from Belgian colonial administrators had already caused millions of the Rwandan population to flee to neighbouring countries - mainly Uganda and Zaire (now DRC) (Tiemessen, 2004:58). When in 1973 Juvénal Habyarimana took control of Rwanda in a coup, he would go on to rule as president for twenty-one years. In his early years as president he was praised for not initiating divisive policies as Kayibanda before him had, however, it quickly became clear that what was key to power in Rwanda was not what was documented in written form, but what was carried out through the country’s historical and still present oral traditions.

In terms of the role of power related to discourse through public speaking, in an authoritarian regime such as Rwanda during Habyarimana’s rule, Meghaddam et al discuss that positioning can complement official roles and assist with crystallising expectations, explain that:

Positioning Theory concerns conventions of speech and action that are labile, contestable and ephemeral… closely related to Goffman’s procedures by which someone establishes a ‘footing’ in a conversation or some other social process… This idea can be expressed in the image of a conversation going on, with someone on the periphery of the group wanting to have a say. How does this person get a footing in the group and gain the right to intervene? (2008: 9)
And so the stronger the power over the discourse in question, the more difficult it becomes for anybody other than a select few to establish a footing in order to publicly adopt a contradictory position. Instead, a consistent official position on a matter becomes the norm, and through accompanying propaganda is legitimised in the minds of the masses. Indeed Louis corroborates this stance by outlining that one of the main goals of positioning theory is:

…to identify who does and does not possess positioning power, the basis on which the power is allocated, and the role of differences in positioning power in the conflict (e.g. in making certain story lines more dominant). (2008: 30)

In the context of Rwanda from post-independence until the genocide in 1994, the nature of M.R.N.D. dominance as a group, and for two decades President Habyarimana’s power as an individual ensured that positioning power was controlled absolutely by the State. Propaganda was supported by the President himself, and through State sponsored organisations which used and reinforced very specific language, and embarked on a planned, long-term strategy of dehumanisation of the Tutsi population of Rwanda. As a consequence of these prior decades, by the time one looks to Rwanda as it moved into the 1990s, it was already a broken and divided society, the members of which had been raised from birth and educated to believe that the two main ethnic groups (Hutu and Tutsi) should not trust each other. (Hilker, 2011:268-272)

Baisley identifies that “Rwandan elites suggested that all Tutsi – even those inside Rwanda – were supporters of the RPF” (2014: 40) and notes that between 1990 and 1994 there were several massacres of Tutsi populations around the country. This is further detailed by Caplan (2007), who identifies eight specific massacres between October 1990 and February 1994 that can all be linked back to individuals associated with the state and state institutions. This is where the importance of political speeches can be asserted, as can be explained with the references from Baisley and Caplan above to Rwandan elites and local / national politicians being responsible for the narrative to that point. Indeed Baisley asserts that:
Habyarimana’s speeches drew on a past when Tutsi had been masters of Hutu peasants… the ideology drew on a (somewhat real and somewhat imagined) past when Hutu were poor peasants and Tutsi were wealthy masters… This ideology manifested itself in propaganda leading up to and during the genocide… My analysis of Radio Rwanda and RTLM broadcasts reveals that both stations exploited constructions of Hutu and Tutsi as occupational/status groups, even if those divisions were more imagined than material by the time of the genocide. (2014: 40)

This explanation then sets the logical premise that the words and direction were first created by the speeches, which created the ideology, and then that ideology was repeated and strengthened by the radio broadcasts. The speeches were the necessary first steps from which the broadcasts took direction. This contention is corroborated by the ICTR, who in 2003 clarified in their judgment of the Nahimana case, regarding that the overarching purpose of the various RTLM broadcasts was “…where at issue is the speech of the so-called ‘majority population’, in support of the government.” (ICTR, 2003: pp1008)

And so the officially documented legal explanation is that the propaganda and hate speech being broadcast, was directly linked with publicly promulgated State ideology. As such, the importance of these speeches cannot be downplayed, rather they ought to be characterised as being one of the root causes for the genocide against the Tutsi that eventually occurred.

Important also as raised previously, is not just what was contained within these speeches, but also what was missing. So whilst the presentation of Hutu power and righteousness is clear, and blameworthiness of the RPF is present, what was missing is explained by Baisley who observes that:

> Habyarimana’s regime did not warn people against confusing supporters of the RPF with Tutsi as an ‘ethnic’ group. Political interest was equated with ‘ethnic’ identity, with the RPF being considered Tutsi and vice versa. (2014: 40)

This missing information as part of the narrative suited the state-constructed meaning system; it made sense to leave the omission unaddressed, as this could allow for denial of responsibility for violent actions that then resulted. Further solidifying this view on the power of the State to control the narrative, Hintjens asserts that:
In Rwanda only some forms of hatred were deliberately nurtured; inter-Hutu rivalries were actively suppressed. Hatred was only legitimate when directed towards a specific target, identified by the state. (2001: 26)

And on the ultimate effect of this misused power and failure of any others with alternative viewpoints to gain a foothold in public discourse, Romeo Dallaire explains that when it came to neutral reporting, or indeed that which might be critical and hold a government to account, “In the case of Rwanda, that’s where the process broke down. The events in Rwanda simply did not break through to such an extent as to create momentum”. (2007: 15) The various analyses of public information in Rwanda at that time all point to one logical conclusion; the totality of power and control Habyarimana and the M.R.N.D. government held.

Upon Habyarimana’s sudden death in his aeroplane’s targeted destruction on April 6th 1994 by persons unknown, the result of decades of propaganda quickly became apparent. In one-hundred days, a large majority of the Tutsi population who were living in Rwanda, as well as many moderate Hutu who had not supported the ideological hatred perpetuated by the controlling regime, were massacred in a swift and brutal genocide. Whilst the number of deaths remains a contested fact, the most recent evidence base suggests that as mass graves have continued to be uncovered in the intervening two decades since the initial 800,000 figure that was used, the true number may be over one million (SURF, 2020).

Words Matter – Rwanda

As in all cases of mass, extreme violence, and in the case of the Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda’s case specifically, there is always the question of what the conditions were that enabled a humanitarian disaster to occur. Whilst the previous sections discussed the social-historical context for division, it only touched upon the issues of hate speech and propaganda. In this sense, Ellul outlines that:

Propaganda is a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals,
psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated in an organization. (1973: 61)

Further detail on the nexus between politics, power, and propaganda is explained by Dojčinović (2012) who argues that there is a clear nexus between politics, power and propaganda where there is always a struggle by those in power to preserve the power they hold, and that programs of political propaganda are frequently planned and are highly strategic in nature based upon specific and intended responses that will emerge in the target audience. One of the most powerful explanations of propaganda, however, was from Harold Lasswell in Propaganda Technique in the World War (1927), where he discusses the complicated nature and context, as well as the scale it can be effective on. He posits that:

…propaganda is one of the most powerful instrumentalities in the modern world. It has arisen to its present eminence in response to a complex of changed circumstances which have altered the nature of society.... A newer and subtler instrument must weld thousands and even millions of human beings into one amalgamated mass of hate and will and hope. (1927: 220-221)

In terms of how propaganda techniques can harness such a volume of human beings into this shared and intentionally constructed state of being (hate, will and hope), Jowett and O’Donnell (2019) explain that in order for propaganda to be at its most effective, the social-historical perspective is crucial, and that the flow of propaganda travels through a network system “originating with an institution and ending with the possibility of response from the public or a target audience within the public” (Jowett and O’Donnell, 2019: 321). It is where there is a clear social-historical perspective which may be harnessed and moulded to fit the objectives of the propagandist that there can be a framed justification created by those in power within the institution where the propaganda originates and the network system’s inception begins.

The success of the propaganda in Rwanda’s case relied upon the three areas, identified by Lasswell above, of hate, will, and hope being nurtured within the target Hutu population. Through the process of dehumanisation of the out-group (the Tutsi) as discussed by Scull,
Mbonyingabo, and Kotb (2016), it became easier to desensitise the Hutu allowing them to act in an objectively cruel and extreme fashion. The concept of cruelty was removed from the psyche of ordinary people in favour of efficiency and speed, allowing for the most brutal methods of killing with machetes, clubs, and other barbaric but effective means.

On how propaganda can be constructed in order to bring about such extreme reactions and achieve mass buy-in from a population, O'Shaughnessy argues that:

The art of propaganda lies in changing perspectives, and to change perspectives we have to alter interpretation, to interpret the emotion-arousing situation in a different way so people reassess its significance… This process is in its fundamentals emotional, not… some sequence of logical inference, but of emotional argument with the aim of persuading the audience to share a perspective or conjure up a certain experience. (2004: 44)

In Rwanda, this pattern can be shown through the repeated themes of Hutu Power and revolution from oppression, whilst simultaneously characterising the Tutsi as being oppressors, untrustworthy, and foreign invaders. The Rwandan State under Habyarimana knew that there was emotional ill-feeling in this regard going back to the previously discussed colonial periods in Rwanda’s history.

With the whole spectrum of media as possible mechanisms for conveying propaganda by the State, in Rwanda both political speeches and radio broadcasts became the weapons of choice, with written propaganda of secondary importance. This may be in part because of the power of the spoken word to convey emotional feeling, the crucial element described by O’Shaughnessy above. In terms of Rwandan society, this was an especially obvious choice as highlighted by many who have written on the subject. Baisley explains that “Violence appeared to increase as radio stations broadcast hate propaganda, more so than when periodicals and magazines published similar propaganda.” (2014: 39) Whilst Baisley is referring specifically to radio stations, the fundamental argument is that the spoken word, with its added linguistic
effects, may have a more powerful propagandistic effect than the written word alone. Indeed, contextualising the issue further in terms of Rwanda, Baisley explains that:

…the oral tradition remained strong, illiteracy was widespread, few Rwandans had foreign language skills, and there was a dearth of alternative sources of information about government. (2014: 39)

All of this then further strengthens the suggestion that in the Rwandan context, indeed it is likely that speech in whichever form would have been the most powerful means by which propaganda could be most effectively conveyed.

On the nature of the information that would then be able to be publicly conveyed to the mass Rwandan population, des Forges explains that even media that on initial scrutiny appeared to be private, on deeper investigation would prove to be controlled by the State asserting that “the ostensibly private station (RTLM) used equipment belonging to various government ministries.” (1999: 69) And so the indications the begin to emerge are that effectively, the centralised power of the Rwandan State was such that it had the ability to control all publicly spoken information, whether through official speeches or through broadcast media.

**Can propaganda be regarded as ‘causal’ related to subsequent violence?**

Not all commentators agree that propaganda has a causal effect on violence that follows. For example, Slocum-Bradley argues that:

any statement can be made about a person’s or group’s ‘intentions’, ‘desires’, ‘wants’ or ‘goals’, but none can be verified. Hence, explanations that (merely) claim to reveal purported ‘motives’ fail to illuminate the mechanisms of meaning construction and thus provide no scientific value. (2008: 210)

However, this is a position that ignores a number of other accepted practices that allow clear inference of motivation and intention. For example, in terms of many legal systems around the world, an accepted means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt is a large combination of circumstantial evidence. The judge in the case of Chan Chweng Kong v Public Prosecutor (1962) explains:
...in cases like this where the evidence is wholly circumstantial what has to be considered is not only the strength of each individual strand of evidence but also the combined strength of each individual strand when twisted together to make a rope. The real question is: is that rope strong enough to hang the prisoner?

This concept and metaphor is a universally used one as part of legal education when future legal practitioners are being taught that no piece of evidence should be viewed in isolation when a case is being constructed, rather it is the totality of evidence that is can render a particular interpretation or inference as being irrebuttable in nature.

Slocum-Bradley further presents an underdeveloped case that seeks to negate the possibility of speech causing any resulting action, arguing that:

While an illocution may ‘incite’ or ‘encourage’ (social force) a particular action, it can never ‘cause’ it... One social force may make another appropriate... However, one social force does not ‘cause’ another... Someone ‘encouraged’ to kill another person can refuse. Thus, an understanding of the normative context generated should be taken neither as a stamp of approval, nor as a suggestion that other options were not available to actors. (2008: 211-212)

Again, the argument presented here ignores relevant context. Whilst the premise might be arguable in a vacuum where an individual is making a choice free of any social-historical context, to try and maintain such a stance in the context of any mass atrocity driven by propaganda would be to deny the evidence of the effects of propaganda researched and published throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In these cases, it is clear that a state-power driven narrative is created that contains only one singular normative set of values or approaches that can be applied by the target group, and that there is no feasible alternative choice that can be made. There is a further problem in this same section where Slocum-Bradley presents causation under a single interpretation. However in legal terms, causation is normally broken into *causa causans* (the primary cause, or the last link to the result), and *causa sine qua non* (an act without which the end result would have been unlikely to occur). So although an act of hate speech or propaganda may not be regarded as ‘causal’ in nature in terms of the *causa*
causans, it most certainly can be regarded as a *causa sine qua non*. Indeed, as explained by Cocks:

> As you study historical events, you will discover that things do not simply ‘happen’ without reason. Historical events are caused by things that occurred before them. Also, historical events create changes that have consequences long after the event is over… Every historical event occurred because of a series of events that happened beforehand. Things that lead to another event are called ‘causes’. Some causes occurred immediately before the event began, while others existed for several years before they caused the event. Causes that occurred only a few hours, days or weeks before the event are called ‘short term causes’. Causes that existed for years, decades or centuries before the event are called ‘long term causes’. (2019)

Ultimately, Cocks presents a strong argument that causation may be interpreted as being on a scale ranging from *direct / short-term* to *indirect / long-term*, with any actions or events on that scale being causal at least to some extent.

As Slocum-Bradley’s analysis continues, the author then presents a detailed set of positioning analyses related to RTLM discourse, the transcripts of which as with those of speeches in this article are sourced directly from the ICTR. She logically sets out how meaning systems are constructed through storylines and positioning, and how that positioning results in legitimisation and consequence stemming from the discourse in question. However in her conclusions then, a further fundamental flaw emerges where she argues that:

> Thus, to eradicate the Tutsis, according to the meaning system constructed by the RTLM journalists, was not only legitimate but the ‘logical’ thing to do. How can the logic inherent to a particular meaning system be countered? One can propose an alternative metaphor: Instead of ‘impurities’, a minority can be an ‘enrichment’ to society. Because an enrichment is something to be treasured and nurtured, the logic of the metaphor suggests a fundamentally different alternative for (normatively) appropriate action. While a meaning system cannot be evaluated for its truth-value (e.g. there is no ‘real’ storyline), it can be evaluated according to the possibilities for action that it makes viable. (2008: 224)

And so the problem with the analysis is that the situation Slocum-Bradley discusses relies upon a non-existent reality that in all contexts there are equal opportunities for alternative positioning, and for opposing viewpoints to gain a foothold in order to contribute to a meaning system. The problem in Rwanda’s case was that the totality of centralised power, including
power over all methods of public discourse resulted in their being only one meaning system communicated, one overarching storyline, and only one normatively appropriate action; the destruction of the Tutsi population. This goes beyond broadcast and print media also into all public political speaking. This relationship (between speech and action) therefore, is clearly causal in nature.

In further strengthening this point, Dojčinović argues that when used effectively, propaganda is not simply a precursor to mass violence:

Political parties, military and paramilitary movements are, for instance, all organized groups. The aspect of ‘psychological manipulation’ of their activities relates to the methods (intentionally) employed with the purpose of bringing people individually, or as groups, to agree on a stipulated action. (2012: 31)

And then at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), through the Nahimana judgment set out that “the ethnic hatred that permeates Kangura had the effect of poison, as evidenced by the testimony of the witness.” (ICTR, 2003: para 243) Again, the words used by the court render the position of propaganda as being not simply prior incitement, rather it is in fact a weapon that plays an active role in the conflict itself.

**On Speeches Specifically**

Louis (2008), when conducting conflict analysis explains the importance of speeches (and other combined oral-physical means of communicating ideas), outlining that body language including punches, holding hands, as well as symbolism including clothing worn, combine with the speech itself in order to convey messages and the specific interpretation those words are intended to carry. These combined oral-physical behaviours that can only coexist with public speech, and not through any form of written word or even radio transmission. Further on the subject of inflammatory speeches, Dojčinović outlines the significance of such public speeches, explaining that:
The content of the messages along with the conditions and circumstances of their utterance… play a key role in determining whether the message is actionable… Based on their status and authority, it can be reasonably suggested that public speakers, leaders and the intellectual elite, have the knowledge and awareness of the possible consequences of their utterances. While the leaders institutionally authorized by law have both legal authority and status, the position of public intellectuals, or other individual citizens for that matter, is commonly based on a status attributed to them by a general social consensus… Patriotic, nationalistic or xenophobic speeches… may lead to a series of incidents or eventually armed conflicts potentially directly resulting in the commission of war crimes. As a matter of fact, all propagandists act with the assumption of 'foreseeable consequences.' That is the very reason why they act. (2012: 26-27)

Considering this perspective then, it can be reasonably argued that the more powerful the speaker, and the more legitimate that power is viewed as being by the audience, the greater the likelihood that members of that audience would deem the issues raised as being actionable would be. It would be difficult to find a more powerful figure in this sense than the president of the country itself. On the subject of intellectuals, Schabas then solidifies the importance of Leon Mugesera’s speech, to follow in more detail later, when he explains that:

There is no magic threshold past which ethnically motivated killing becomes genocide. The real test lies in the intent of the perpetrator. Mugesera's speech had brought us face to face with a genocidal intent. His call for destruction of Rwanda's Tutsi population was the decisive new element…Mugesera himself did not commit genocide, although his speech sparked a series of atrocities directed against Tutsi in the Gisenyi region of the country… The road to genocide in Rwanda was paved with hate speech. (2000: 144)

And so it is clear that the nature of speeches in Rwanda leading up to the genocide in 1994 may be an important factor in the violence that occurred, and that further analysis of those speeches is warranted in order to establish if such conclusions can indeed be drawn out.

**Theoretical Framework**

When considering the case of Rwanda, and President Habyarimana’s ability to control the actions of the Interahamwe (the militant youth wing of the M.R.N.D.) and the wider Hutu population to the point that they would kill and consider this to be little more than work, this would fit into the Weber (1978) and Dahl (1957) models of power where Habyarimana is exercising power over his citizens in the form of “A has power over B to the extent that he can
get B to do something B would not otherwise do” (Dahl, 1957: 202-3) where A is Habyarimana and B may be either the Interahamwe or the wide Hutu population.

Where Foucault views that power and knowledge are inseparable, with the repeated linking together of each in his work, it should be clear then that those that are able to create and manipulate knowledge are the same people that ultimately hold power. In discussing Foucault, Sheridan explains that:

No body of knowledge can be formed without a system of communications, records, accumulation and displacement which is in itself a form of power and which is linked, in its existence and functioning, to the other forms of power. Conversely, no power can be exercised without the extraction, appropriation, distribution or retention of knowledge. (1980: 283)

In Rwanda with physical divisions in formal education whereby Tutsi and Hutu children were physically separated and given different learning experiences, where top-down knowledge was fed to the population via the State sponsored RTLM radio station and through publications such as Kangura, nearly all public discourse from childhood through to adulthood from the early 1970s until 1994 included anti-Tutsi sentiment and propaganda. This totalitarian power over knowledge is a clear example of Foucault’s position on the inextricability of each from the other, at least in the Rwandan context.

Foucault further discusses in *The History of Sexuality* the importance of discourse to power, however emphasises that the ability to control public discourse can be used either for the retention of existing power, or for the purposes of resistance, noting:

…a discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart. (1978: 100-1)

When considering the theoretical analysis of Weber, Dahl and Foucault then, it would appear that the context of Rwanda the identity-based conflict that, although existing prior to Habyarimana’s coup in 1973 with clear evidence of violence in the 1950s and 1960s, escalated
particularly from the 1970s until the 1994 genocide under the Habyarimana regime aligns
clearly with the suggested models whereby the centralised power-knowledge-discourse held
by the State, and associated lack of the same from the victim group are predominantly the way
in which both tensions and hatred were by design escalated, leading first to civil war and then
to genocide.

Methodology

Discourse Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis

On analysis of the theoretical framework discussed above then, the choice and justification of
Discourse Analysis (DA) as a methodological tool should be clearly understood. Discourse
analysis is a common method utilised when analysing political speech; as highlighted by
Boodhoo and Purmessur (2009), where the authors discuss that in particular, spoken discourse
is the most common method employed by politicians to harness a wide audience as it is more
effective in capturing and retaining the attention of a wide audience than written text alone.
The authors use the phrase ‘political marketing’ (2009: 4), which is a particularly striking
phrase illustrating that the concepts of consumer buy-in for a product and populace buy-in to a
political ideology may not be dramatically different.

In refining further the appropriate methodologies that may be applied to the topic in hand then,
the most readily apparent and natural fit is to embark on a critical discourse analysis (CDA).
As explained by van Dijk (1995: 17-18) CDA does not intend to focus on a theoretical
paradigm, although such paradigms may be included, rather it aims to focus on a societal
problem or issue whereby power and inequality are either tackled or reinforced depending on
the discourse adopted. Within CDA it is common to consider linked methods of communication
including spoken and written word, body language and gestures, as well as alternative media
such as sound and visual aids. Perhaps the most important facet of CDA is again highlighted
by van Dijk where he explains that:
CDA Specifically focuses on the strategies of manipulation, legitimisation, the manufacture of consent and other discursive ways to influence the minds (and indirectly the actions) of people in the interests of the powerful. This attempt to uncover the discursive means of mental control and social influence implies a critical and oppositional stance, against the powerful and the elites and especially those who abuse their power. (1995, p.18, original emphasis)

The need for such a methodology is simple, in that it is not contentious to say that political discourse is at least partially constructed to influence the way that society views particular issues, and shape or alter the mind-set of the viewer or listener. Possibly more contentious, but accepted by the author is that there are often covert, ulterior, or even indoctrinating hidden or subliminal messages conveyed within political discourse that are deliberately constructed in this way to “retreat into mystification and impersonality” (Kress, 1988: 57) and effectively preclude any possibility of direct challenge on accountability when the subliminal instruction or passive approval are then acted upon.

In practice then, when conducting the CDA, each level of discourse will be analysed, from the social conditions that have led to the discourse being created and how those might validate the given interpretation; then moving on to the process (if this can be ascertained or inferred) by which the discourse was constructed i.e. if the discourse was pre-planned or spontaneous, and how this might aid interpretation; and finally the discourse itself, which will be critically analysed in light of the first two levels. As relates to the discourse itself, an interpretation of how the speaker’s underlying intention might be discerned by considering the interaction surrounding the discourse, and finally a critical explanation concluded by drawing links between the discourse, interaction, and wider social conditions. This structure of analysis should then close the circle whereby, as highlighted by van Dijk (1995), politicians may start a process by either explicitly or implicitly attributing major societal problems to a particular (often minority voting) group, which then has the effect of influencing the mind-set of another (usually majority voting) group. That (majority) group can then be observed to act in accordance with that influence and blame the targeted (minority) group, which through
mainstreaming attitudes has the effect of legitimising policy and action that may lead to further prejudice and marginalisation, and effectively ending the process with the same party from which it originated, having had the desired effect.

**The Importance of Context**

The importance of ‘real’ context for the comparative elements of this paper is crucial. In order to convey the realities of unchallenged manipulation and legitimation, and of the resulting human suffering, elements of ethnography will be utilised. These will be minor and extend only to one of the potential ethnographic foci as identified by Atkinson and Hammersley when the authors categorise combined characteristics that may be classed as ethnographic in nature, this being “narrative description as the product of analysis that includes an unequivocal acknowledgement of interpretation of the significance and purpose of human behaviour” (1998: 110) In practice, this ethnographic element comprises a brief narrative description at the outset, of the author’s first-hand account of being present in spaces where genocidal acts had taken place in Rwanda. Many of those spaces have been preserved as they were found at the conclusion of the genocide, and are open to the public having been established as memorial sites to the victims of those killed at the hands of perpetrators.

**Underpinning Data**

In collecting data to carry out a systematic CDA and indeed if carrying out any study involving linguistics, in order to achieve the highest quality and most reliable results it is important that either the individual is present at the event, or has access to a complete transcript of the speech / conversation in question. Whilst this is difficult in the context of a retrospective analysis then, the nature of public speeches and events when there is clear dialogue between the speaker and their audience becomes appropriate for the application of CDA when transcripts of such events exist.
After a careful search, a fully transcribed event from 15th November 1992 admitted as an exhibit during the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda case against Karemera and Ngitumpatse was sourced, where President Habyarimana was carrying out a speech at a rally for the ruling MRND party with the subject matter including allegations of hate crimes that had been committed against Tutsi civilians by Hutu extremists. At the event, Habyarimana invited comment and gave response on several occasions, creating the conditions appropriate for CDA. As courtroom evidence, the accuracy of transcription will have been professionally verified.

In further justification of the use of such public speeches, Verwimp has argued strongly in the context explicitly related to speeches held in Rwanda by President Habyarimana that:

> These speeches, contrary to those he made abroad, are directed at the Rwandan population and, as such, reveal the way the dictator saw his country, its population and his own task as leader. These speeches should not be considered mere rhetoric. I will show that Habyarimana actually implemented the policies that he advocated in his speeches… It will be demonstrated that his ideology served as a legitimation for the policies he advocated and especially for his personal hold onto power. (2004, p.2)

With few such affirmed transcripts of Habyarimana’s discourse available, and on further searching, a further transcript emerged that had been professionally translated by professor Thomas Kamanazi for the Canadian High Court as part of a hearing into the status as a refugee of Leon Mugesera, a former M.R.N.D. vice chairman, who had fled to Canada in 1993 claiming refugee status. Similarly to the Habyarimana speech, Mugesera had been speaking at an MRND party event, only a matter of days after Habyarimana’s own discourse. This is useful, as the comparability of the discourse and content from a further speech by different State actor in close proximity to Habyarimana’s prior speech has the potential to strengthen the arguments surrounding the centralisation of power-knowledge and its potentially calamitous real-life consequences when there is a lack of ability for any discourse that resists that power-knowledge to emerge.
As a tool to carry out the CDA then, an amended version of Wodak’s 2001 categorisation model for Critical Discourse Analysis has been compiled, with the Wodak’s existing strategies of; *referential / nomination; predication; argumentation; perspectivation, framing or discourse representation*; and; *intensification, mitigation, mystification*. The amendment comes with a further identified strategy of *deflection*, as this has been identifies as a repeated clear strategy within speeches. This is a fully original element that has not been included in any previously published discourse analysis examined on the subject found by the author.

In terms of the Speech of President Juvénal Habyarimana at a M.R.N.D. meeting held in Ruhengeri, Rwanda on 15th November 1992, the key Strategic themes of the speech that emerged from the analysis included self-presentation, false equivalence, negative ‘other’ presentation, legitimation of extremist factions, and de-legitimation of the ‘other’ group.

Similarly, in the Speech of Leon Mugesera a week later at another M.R.N.D. conference held in Kabaya, Rwanda on 22nd November 1992, the key Strategic themes that emerged from the analysis included self-presentation, negative ‘other’ presentation, legitimation of extremist factions, and de-legitimation of the ‘other’ group that had been present in the Habyarimana speech a few days beforehand.

Two short representative example of sections of the tables used to capture the data from the speeches and reduce it for relevant analysis are shown below for illustrative purposes:

**TABLE 1. Speech of President Juvénal Habyarimana, MRND Meeting, Ruhengeri, Rwanda, 15th November 1992**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Devices</th>
<th>Examples from Speech</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perspectivation, Framing or</td>
<td>Expressing personal involvement,</td>
<td>Reporting, description, narration or</td>
<td>‘We firmly sustain the security’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse Representation</td>
<td>situating the speaker’s point of view</td>
<td>quotation of events or utterances</td>
<td>‘We wish firmly that the peace comes back in our country’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
‘It is the reason for which we sustain the negotiations in progress in Arusha.’

‘I, personally, in the name of the MRND, I declare the every time that the MRND party sustains the negotiations’

---

**TABLE 2. Speech of Leon Mugesera, MRND Conference, Kabaya, Rwanda, 22nd November 1992**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Devices</th>
<th>Examples from Speech</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argumentation</td>
<td>Justification of attributed positive or negative labels</td>
<td>Topoi used to justify political inclusion or exclusion, discrimination or preferential treatment</td>
<td>‘I tell you that the Gospel has changed in our movement’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘Tell me, if you as a man, a mother or father’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘our movement is also a movement for peace’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘Some have quoted the following saying: “Those who seek peace always make ready for war”’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘Tell me, dear parents gathered here’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘now she is attacking teachers!’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘these teachers must continue to educate our children’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘we cannot let ourselves be invaded: this is Forbidden’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘they come back armed with guns on behalf of the “Inyenzis”’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘we will never agree to die because the law refuses to act’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
‘even the others who pass for Christians were placed on one side. When an M.R.N.D. member showed his card, he was immediately shot’

‘I know you are men, you are young women, fathers and mothers of families, who will not allow yourselves to be invaded, who will reject contempt.’

**Analysis & Discussion**

On considering the key principles that underpin CDA; that discourse is often controlled by the powerful and the elite, and often adopts strategies of manipulation, legitimation, mystification; the analysis conducted discovered repeated trends in both of the 1992 speeches conducted by President Habyarimana and Leon Mugesera. There were clear examples of comparable discourse included that had been constructed in such a way that it sought to deflect the specific controversial topic under discussion to an unrelated area that position either the speaker themselves or the group responsible for the violence in question in a more positive light. In a number of these cases this deflection attempts to present a false equivalence, whilst refusing to acknowledge blame for groups responsible for violent incidents. The discourse seeks also to raise the social standing of the perpetrator group, whilst simultaneously damaging the social standing and reputation of the victim group by referring to different positive and negative aspects of each group’s behaviour. In some ways this can be linked to the predication strategies, but is distinct enough as a strategy to be classified in its own right. Hence, the *deflection* category was added to the pre-existing list of strategies that had been identified by Wodak in her original model.

In terms of the referential / nomination and predication strategies that aim to construct in-groups and out-groups as well as create false equivalence through this process, in addition to the construction of positive or negative traits as highlighted above, there are several further examples outlined. These strategies, in addition to the creation of false equivalence, then
further seek to absolve a large proportion of the aggressor group of blame and paint them as scapegoats. This is clear when analysing President Habyarimana’s explicit construction of the Interahamwe as scapegoats for the mass killings that they had in fact been responsible for during the 1990-1992 period (which later were evidenced to have been effectively a series of tests of impunity in the lead in to the eventual 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi). On examination of Mugesera’s speech, he moves beyond the more subtle tactics adopted by Habyarimana, and leaves no such room for doubt by making numerous references to the RPF and wider Tutsi population as being inzenzi (cockroaches), whilst encouraging those listening to replace the former reference to inkotanyi (tough fighters) with the clearly dehumanising former terminology. On the other hand, Mugesera in referring to MRND members and the Hutu population consistently refers to them using familial terms such as brothers, family, and the simple collective we, which has the effect of creating a clear division between us and them for the listener, a simple form of othering.

Moving on to the argumentation strategies adopted, Habyarimana’s discourse appears to have the purpose of using topoi to justify political inclusion and exclusion as well as either preferential or discriminatory behaviour applied respectively to the in and out groups. Similar topoi of patriotism and nationalism, law and order, peace and security, and family and childhood are evidenced in order to legitimise the aggressor group and justify demonisation of the victim group. Similarly in Mugesera’s speech, there are further references to peace, family and childhood, as well as repeated use of both religion and the fear of invasion by a violent enemy group. This would seem to be a clear and planned strategy with many corelating topoi and parallels from each of the two speeches, and a possible indication of deliberate abuse of power-knowledge through public discourse intended to lead to conflict.

Looking to perspectivation, framing and representation by the speaker related to the discourse, the circumstances and narrative are framed in such a way as to clearly situate Habyarimana’s
personal stance on the violent actions in question and both the victim and aggressor groups. President Habyarimana represents the aggressor group as being either wholly innocent or with an explicit justification for their actions, whilst simultaneously seeking to invalidate or minimise the victimhood of those whom the violence in question was committed against. President Habyarimana sets out his perspective that the MRND and Interahamwe (the aggressor group) are the ones maintaining peace and security, carrying then the clear implication that the victim group are the ones responsible for the violent actions to which they had been subjected. Once again, Mugesera takes these same concepts and amplifies them beyond doubt, moving from the implicit to the explicit. On multiple occasions he directly aligns his opinion with fact, blurring the boundaries in this regard. He continually refers directly to the truthfulness of his statements, and his speech culminates in the personal and direct stance and threat that the Tutsi population in general are not naturally Rwandan, that they are Ethiopian, and that they will be sent back to Ethiopia through being thrown in the Nyabarongo river. With this statement he moves beyond doubt that in his opinion the enemy were not simply the ‘invading army’ he had alluded to previously, but all of the ordinary Tutsi civilians living in Rwanda.

On analysing the strategies of mystification in the discourse, yet again there are clear comparisons and similarities that can be drawn. President Habyarimana seeks to mystify the culpability of the aggressor group by refusing to label mass killings correctly, describing them as disturbances, then calling the investigation into question and highlighting an apparent lack of evidence when the investigators are not present to answer to this allegation. Habyarimana then refers to the investigations themselves as pseudo in nature, further calling their legitimacy and professionalism into question. Through his discourse, there is a clear and intentional mystification of the murders themselves, as well as the circumstances under which the murders in question had been carried out. For Mugesera, he seeks to diminish any notion of RPF strength
by describing those members of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) who had lost key strategic positions in the north of the country during the (at that point) two-year civil war, as being weakened by suffering low morale, and this being the reason that territories had been lost. Further, with an example of Government forces robbing local shops in the north, Mugesera blurs the concept of responsibility by tying the issue together with the RPF ‘descending’ on the region, thus seeking to absolve the State from responsibility in this regard at least to some extent.

Finally there is the newly created deflection category. Here the objective of the discourse is to avoid acknowledgement of a crisis and to avoid any blame or accountability related to the actions in question, and to deflect the direction of the discourse onto a different subject matter altogether. President Habyarimana appears to have a strategy of raising and discussing controversial issues that have the potential to reflect badly on him and the State should the discourse become too detailed, and then deflect the conversation to avoid such in-depth or critical discussion. Where negativity might have already been externally assigned to the aggressor group by investigators, Habyarimana would then deflect by discussing the material issues of their looking attractive in their uniform / clothing to bring a positive light. Then for no clear or apparent reason, Habyarimana deflected the central issues altogether by further discussing the irrelevant (in the context of this particular speech) matter of his own willingness to help refugee school children by personally paying for their school materials. Discussion of both of these areas were placed in order to deflect those external negative perspectives on the Interahamwe and State culpability for violence, and replace the direction of the conversation with a discourse that presented both the aggressor group, as well as himself personally, in a more positive light. Whilst there is less than this in Mugesera’s speech, he did attempt to paint both himself and President Habyarimana in a positive light in a slightly deflecting fashion, when discussing the MRND flags he personally distributed and enjoyed seeing, and on
describing Habyarimana as ‘invincible’ whilst boasting about party members from rival political groups deflecting to join the MRND, thus emphasising the ruling party’s popularity and the ruler’s power and strength.

As outlined in the justification for the use of critical discourse analysis, it is crucial to consider the social conditions in which the society subject to the discourse is set, and whether these conditions serve to validate the analysis and conclusions drawn out of the discourse itself, then discussing the nature of the discourse itself and any suggestion as to whether it may have been either planned or spontaneous.

In the case of Rwanda, and in hindsight, it is unproblematic to assert that the given analysis and interpretation of the discourse should be viewed as accurate and indicative of a wider power-knowledge-discourse strategy. When there have been multiple and objectively irrebuttable accounts of a genocide taking place against the Tutsi less than eighteen months after the analysed speeches, and where journalists, academics and members of Habyarimana’s M.R.N.D. Government have been convicted by an impartial tribunal for crimes that are fundamentally linked to the demonisation and dehumanisation of the Tutsi population, it is clear that the social conditions of the country at the time the speeches were made clearly correlate with the analysis presented throughout this article.

On the subject of the planned or spontaneous nature of the discourse, this is somewhat more difficult to conclude with certainty. Verwimp has tackled this issue previously, concluding:

Did Habyarimana write his speeches all by himself? This question remains open, but he probably did not. According to my informants, at least three people helped him: Ferdinand Nahimana, professor of history and leading intellectual of the regime; Jeanne Charles, a Swiss professor and consultant to the president; and C. Mfusi, a Rwandan journalist who later became a critic of the regime. (2004, p.2)

Importantly, Verwimp only refers to others having ‘helped’ Habyarimana, with implication being that Habyarimina was still the main creator of the discourse in question. As highlighted
earlier in this article, Verwimp makes it explicitly clear that the words spoken by Habyarimana in his speeches tended to then be reflected in his policies, further strengthening the perspective that the discourse is a reflection of the power he personally held.

For Mugesera on the other hand, through the many court documents surrounding his own trial and prior hearings, there are no indications that anyone other than himself had been involved in the construction of his speech, which was likely to have been in part pre-prepared and in part spontaneous in form. Evidence of a degree of prior preparation can be argued given the similarities noted throughout the critical discourse analysis between speeches.

Ultimately, the centralised power-knowledge-discourse relationship combining the theories of Weber, Dahl and Foucault as outlined through the theoretical framework, is confirmed in the Rwandan context at least through the analysis presented, when considering that the propagandic content of the speeches had the eventual effect of the near destruction of the targeted victim group, and the fact that the main perpetrators were not in fact trained combatants, but were ordinary citizens who had been conditioned on a mass scale to hate and eventually to kill.

Conclusions
In nearly every developed country around the world, freedom of expression is a conditional right that can be interfered with or even removed for a large variety of reasons. One of those typical reasons is to ensure that hate speech is never deemed to be legal, and can be treated as a criminal act by the State in question. People are free to think what they want, and hold whatever ideology they like; however, they are not free to act on those ideologies with evil intent or to incite others to join them. Under these circumstances it would be worth considering the ideas raised by Karl Popper’s Paradox of Tolerance, often shortened and taken out of
context to say that unpopular opinions must be suppressed. In fact, Popper’s full explanation is more detailed and nuanced than this overly simplified tag-line:

Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them. — In this formulation, I do not imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies; as long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be unwise. But we should claim the right to suppress them if necessary even by force; for it may easily turn out that they are not prepared to meet us on the level of rational argument, but begin by denouncing all argument; they may forbid their followers to listen to rational argument, because it is deceptive, and teach them to answer arguments by the use of their fists or pistols. We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant. (Popper, 1945)

Popper’s words should make sense when considering the full Rwandan context in both a historical and contemporary sense. When unjustifiable hatred and intolerance, and other rhetoric based on fear of ‘the other’ is espoused by the most powerful individuals in a country, it should come as no surprise when the ordinary person follows with the belief that their own previously suppressed opinions and actions, can be repeated or acted upon in public without fear of repercussion. Popper explains that it shouldn’t always be necessary to suppress intolerant philosophies where alternative discourse is permissible, and this aligns precisely with the theoretical framework set at the outset where Foucault argues that discourse has the potential to assist with both retention of and resistance to power when discourse is held in a society that is not under a totalitarian rule and opposing discourse is not permitted. In these circumstances, it would seem that all public discourse then seeks to strengthen the power through the control of societal knowledge, and to target and eradicate all threats to those discourse narratives.

It is in these totalitarian contexts then that Popper’s paradox of tolerance becomes more relevant and where arguably a key strategy when credible signs of the emergence of a totalitarian State become apparent might be to not tolerate the intolerant. In other words, to
resist the attempt to wield power in order dominate a discourse to the exclusion of competing discourse by possibly enacting policy to ban certain types of discourse being held in public. This can be a controversial tactic as many citizens around the globe buy into total freedom of expression as an express right, however those that have been direct or indirect victims of hatred might hold a different view, whereby there may be legitimacy in having at least some degree of legal protection from, in particular, hate speech. Indeed, several countries have laws prohibiting issues such as Holocaust denial (for example; Austria: section 3h of the National Socialism Prohibition law; Belgium, Negationism Law; Czech Republic, 2001 Law Against Support and Dissemination of Movements Oppressing Human Rights and Freedoms s261a, Germany, the Volksverhetzung, otherwise referred to as the law of ‘incitement of the people’, s130 Incitement to Hatred, revised as recently as 2015), and many others have laws banning hate speech in general. In the Rwandan context it should not therefore be particularly surprising that there are laws surrounding public discourse when it stray onto issues of genocide denial and ethnic identity, given the grave consequences directly linked to the gross misuse of power in this regard through the discourse of the previous totalitarian regime. Indeed to express that this is inappropriate could be argued to be both a double standard (in light of the earlier discussed current Holocaust denial legislation in Europe), and ethnocentric in nature.

This normalisation of hatred that has been evidenced through abuse of power and a totalitarian hold on the power-knowledge-discourse relationship in many jurisdictions must be halted globally, to prevent further mass outbreaks of violence similar to what happened in Rwanda in 1994. If not, then it is inevitable that the centralisation of power in the wrong hands will continue to lead to either escalation of conflict or further violence in a number of potentially vulnerable jurisdictions.
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